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FOREWORD
Daniel T. Murphy
This year’s annual symposium sponsored by the Richmond
Journal of Global Law and Business is titled “A Collision of Authority:
The U.S. Constitution and Universal Jurisdiction.”  During the sympo-
sium spirited presentations were given by three extremely prominent
constitutional law and international law scholars: Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, and Professor Jeremy
Rabkin.1
The doctrine of universal jurisdiction, or the universality prin-
ciple, is an international law principle supporting a nation state’s au-
thority to enact laws asserting criminal jurisdiction over certain
conduct when the more usual bases supporting the assertion of juris-
diction are not present.  Normally a state regulates or punishes con-
duct on the basis that the actor or the victim is one of its nationals or
when the conduct takes place within its territory or its effects are felt
there.  The universality principle is generally used to support the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over conduct such as piracy, genocide, or war
crimes.2  The notion is that such conduct is an affront to humanity in
general and that thus any nation state has the right to punish such
conduct.  The principle thus would support a state’s right to enact a
statute punishing genocide even though the conduct took place outside
of its territory, and neither the victims nor the perpetrators were its
nationals.3
1 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, School of Law, University of California, Irvine; Pro-
fessor Mary Ellen O’Connell, Robert & Marion Short Professor of Law and Re-
search Professor of International Dispute Resolution, Law School, Notre Dame
University; Professor Jeremy A. Rabkin, School of Law, George Mason University.
2 The universality principle itself is not a law or statute punishing such conduct.
It is the international law doctrine supporting a nation state’s specific statute pun-
ishing such conduct. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §404 (1986); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 668 (6th ed.
2008).
3 See The Genocide Convention Implementation (Proxmire) Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1091 (2009).  The jurisdictional provision of the Proximire Act was amended, ef-
fective December, 2009, to read as follows:
(e) Jurisdiction. – There is jurisdiction over the offenses de-
scribed in subsections (a), (c) and (d) if  -
(1) the offense is committed in whole or in part in within the
United States; or
(2) regardless of where the offense is committed, the alleged
offender is –
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The focus of the discussion during the symposium was on the
application of the universality doctrine to conduct of the United States
in the post 9/11 era.
Professor O’Connell centered her remarks on choice of law is-
sues.  She clearly explained the international law distinctions among
the laws applicable within a country during a period of international
armed conflict, a period of armed but not international conflict, and
peacetime.  In her view there is no conflict between the Constitution
and the principle of universal jurisdiction.  As an example of universal
jurisdiction she noted that a provision common to all four of the Ge-
neva conventions4 requires signatory states to investigate and prose-
cute grave breaches of the conventions including among such breaches
willful killing, torture, and unlawful confinement of persons protected
under the conventions.5  The conflict of law rules determine the proper
(A) a national of the United States . . .;
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence
in the United States . . .;
(C) a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the
United States; or
(D) present in the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1091(e).  Prior to 2007 the Act only applied to conduct taking place in
the United States or to conduct of a U.S. national. See Genocide Convention Im-
plementation (Proxmire) Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2002).  In 2007 a new
subsection (d)(5) was added to the statute providing that “after the conduct re-
quired for the offense occurs, the alleged offender is brought into, or found in, the
United States, even if that conduct occurred outside the United States.” See Geno-
cide Convention Implementation (Proxmire) Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(5)
(2007).  The 2009 amendments deleted former subsection (d) and added a new sub-
section (d) criminalizing attempts and conspiracies to commit the covered offenses
and added the new subsection (e) which clarifies the jurisdictional reach of the Act.
See Genocide Convention Implementation (Proxmire) Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C
§ 1091(d), (e) (2009).
Subsection (e)(2)(D) clearly seems to be based on the universality principle.  It
would allow criminal prosecution of a non-US national for conduct perpetrated
outside the United States so long as the person was present in the United States.
The language of that subsection is interesting to consider in relation to the Su-
preme Court’s extraordinarily generous deference to governmental conduct in ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the Alvarez-Machain case.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).  See generally STEVEN R.
RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009) (discussing state jurisdic-
tion over crimes of genocide).
4 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 146 & 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [here-
inafter Geneva IV].
5 The conventions actually first call upon the signatory countries to enact laws
criminalizing such conduct.  Geneva IV, supra note 4, at art. 146.  There is an
2010] FOREWORD 303
law to be applied.  She maintained that during an international armed
conflict the conventions apply to the conduct covered by them to the
exclusion of any other law.  Since all nations of the world are signato-
ries to these conventions, it is appropriate that statutes in other coun-
ties provide for the prosecution of those responsible for the infamous
“torture memos” or the rendition of individuals to the custody of gov-
ernmental agents of countries where they will be tortured.  There is
nothing in the Constitution inconsistent with another nation’s asser-
tion of jurisdiction in such cases.  Her remarks lead easily into those of
Dean Chemerinsky.
In Dean Chemerinsky’s view, the notion of the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction and statutes based on it have been part of our con-
stitutional tradition from the earliest days of republic.  The Alien Tort
Statute,6 which is part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,7 was given as an
example of this sensitivity to international matters.  Throughout our
history, in times of national distress the Constitution has not always
provided the promised protections to its citizens, and correspondingly
government officials have been allowed to act in ways inconsistent
with those protections.  While this is not a new phenomenon8, the gov-
ernment’s conduct in the post 9/11 era has certainly provided ample
evidence of these deficiencies.  In his view, the government’s creation
of the class of individuals known as “enemy combatants,” who the gov-
ernment claimed can be detained indefinitely and whose status is not
reviewable in any court, created a legal “black hole,” and in this hole
the enemy combatants were thrown.  Of course, the Supreme Court
has reversed many of the government’s positions.9  But he argued that
nonetheless universal jurisdiction and the possibility that actions of
our government agents engaged in conduct amounting to gross abuse
of human rights may be reviewable and punished under the criminal
law of other nations provides a necessary check on the government’s
argument that statutes enacted by a nation state with respect to punishment of
breaches of the law of war are not enacted under the support of the universality
principle, but rather they are supported by the treaty and the mutual consent of
the treaty signatories. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
306 (7th ed. 2008).
6 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”  28 U.S.C. §1350.
7 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
8 Among these times of crisis he noted the internment of citizens of Japanese an-
cestry during the second world war, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), and the excesses of the McCarthy era United States, Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
9 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004).
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tendency to overreact.  It is also the means by which the “rule of law”
in times of national emergency will prevail.
Professor Rabkin’s presentation was a forceful rejection of
Dean Chemerinsky’s and Professor O’Connell’s positions.  In his view,
reference to the principle of universal jurisdiction is not a long-stand-
ing part of our constitutional tradition.  In his view, the constitutional
power of Congress “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the high seas and Offenses against the Law of Nations”10 is not
an authorization to enact a statute supported by universal jurisdiction.
In his view, the framers in drafting the quoted section of the Constitu-
tion had in mind piracies and other offenses on the high seas commit-
ted by or against US citizens or their property and offenses against the
law of nations committed in the United States.11  Moreover, in his
view, the universality principle gloss placed on the Alien Tort Statute
is of recent vintage, first manifesting itself in the Second Circuit’s 1980
opinion in the Filartiga12 case.  He noted that nations with different
sensibilities and cultures may very well have differing interpretations
as to what constitutes the grievous offenses punishable as war crimes,
etc. and certainly will require different elements of proof of the offense.
To allow courts in other countries to judge the legitimacy of decisions
taken by government officials here is thought to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, and the notion of constitutionalism in general, be-
cause it undermines the ability of the courts where the action is taken
or whose nationals are involved, and thus have the greatest interest in
the matter, to determine for themselves legitimacy of the action.  As a
10 U.S CONST., art. I § 8 cl. 10.
11 See generally Eugene Kantorovich, Symposium: Public International Law and
Economics: The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 ILL. L. REV. 389 (2008);
Eugene Kantorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183 (2004).  The Alien Tort Statute was enacted in
part in response to assaults in Philadelphia and New York City on foreign diplo-
mats.  Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784); see generally Sosa v. Al-
verez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716-717 (2004).
12  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit has referred to the Alien Tort Act as a “legal
Lohengrin” noting that “no one seems to know whence it came.”  IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).  See Justice Souter’s lengthy exposition of
the historical background of the ATA in Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
712–21 (2004).
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consequence the doctrine is destabilizing, and instead of contributing
to the “rule of law,” it works to undermine that rule.
Daniel T. Murphy
Professor of Law
University of Richmond School of Law
